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The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal, 
Tokyo 2000: a feminist response to revisionism?  
Christine LÉVY 
The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military 
Sexual Slavery (hereafter the Women’s International Tribunal) took 
place in Tokyo, Japan from December 8-12, 2000.1 The Violence 
Against Women in War Network (VAWW-NET),2 the main organizer 
of the Tribunal,3 had been constituted following an international 
conference there in 1997. At the conference, approximately 
40 women activists from 20 different countries had come together to 
discuss the atrocities committed against women during armed 
conflicts, reflecting the growing international awareness of such 
crimes following the events in the former Yugoslavia and in 
Rwanda.4 The trial in Tokyo capped a decade in which former 
“comfort women” had begun speaking out about their experiences.  
                                                     
1  The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual 
Slavery, Nihongun seidoreisei o sabaku josei kokusai senpan hôtei, better known as Josei 
kokusai senpan hôtei. See Nishino 2009 and http://www1.jca.apc.org/vaww-net-
japan/english/ womenstribunal2000/basicpapers.html. 
2   VAWW-NET 2002. 
3   http://vawwrac.org/?page_id=213 (accessed June 24, 2013).  
4   The International Criminal Court was established by the Rome Statute, voted by 
60 countries at the Rome Conference in July 1998 (accessed June 24, 2013): 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0211-f.htm#lestatut 
126      Christine Lévy 
 
 
Why a new trial in Tokyo? 
No acknowledgement of sexual violence 
Japan began setting up “comfort stations” in 1932, and more 
systematically from 1938,5 deporting young women from various 
Asian countries, but mainly from Korea, to military field brothels in 
occupied territory. As the conflict expanded, growing numbers of 
these young women and girls, referred to euphemistically as “comfort 
women” (ianfu),6 were brought to the war zones through lies, trickery, 
violence or force, right up until Japan’s defeat. When the army 
retreated, these women were generally abandoned, but some were 
also killed in the “collective suicides” – gyokusai7 – that took place 
toward the end of the war, for example in Saipan.8 
Even though these facts were known when the Tokyo War 
Crimes Trials (International Military Tribunal for the Far East  
– IMTFE) took place from 3 May 1946 to 4 November 1948, the 
issue went largely unmentioned, since sexual violence against women 
was not, as such, recognized as a war crime. In terms of international 
                                                     
5  Historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki has found documentation on the first establishments 
in 1932 and 1933 (Yoshimi 1995: 14-21) but the archives show that they only 
began on a larger scale in 1938 (Yoshimi 1995: 34-35 and 2000: 58-59). 
6  The term ianfu is a euphemism that designates women forced into “sexual service” 
in centers known as “comfort stations” (ianjo), directly or indirectly managed by the 
Imperial Japanese Army. The Army introduced the word ianfu (wianbu in Korean 
and weianfu in Chinese or Taiwanese) to give an aura of legality to this form of 
prostitution (Hayakawa 2005: 17-28). It appears in official army documents from 
1938 on, although the first ianjo (comfort station) dates from 1932 (Yoshimi 1992: 
90-92 and 2000: 43-45). Steadily declining estimates of the number of ianfu, a 
subject of debate, have been advanced by the leading “revisionist” historian, Hata 
(who in 1993 put their number at 90,000 and in 1999 at 20,000), while other 
historians, particularly in China, have raised their estimates considerably, suggesting 
there may have been as many as 400,000 (Su 1999). 
7  Gyokusai (literally “shattered jewel” or “to die gallantly as a jewel shatters”) was 
the term used by the Japan’s Supreme War Council to refer to the annihilation of 
all forces engaged on a battlefield. No official suicide order ever existed, but it 
was forbidden for any troop to retreat or surrender. 
8  Sometimes Japanese ianfu advised Korean women to surrender (Senda 1973: 
133), thinking this might save them. 
 The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal, Tokyo 2000      127 
 
 
law, Article 46 of the “Laws and Customs of War on Land” (Hague 
Convention, 1907) provided only for convictions for rape if it was 
seen as a violation of family honor. At the time, the prosecutors from 
the Netherlands, China and France had given written proof of the 
violence inflicted on “comfort women” in Indonesia, East Timor, 
China, and Indochina. These violent acts had also been denounced 
during the trials of Class B and C war criminals, for example in 
China, Guam, and Saigon. But only the wrongs suffered by women 
from Allied countries were considered. For nearly fifty years, the 
women of Asia had to remain silent in their native countries, and they 
continue to maintain their silence to this day in Indonesia9 and in 
Malaysia, where only one woman has come forward as a former ianfu. 
The bilateral treaties signed by Korea and Japan in 1965 make no 
mention at all of their existence. 
 How could this experience shared by millions of soldiers have 
been ignored in Japan itself? Mythologized in certain literary and 
cinematic representations, the magnitude and horror of it only came 
to light at the beginning of the 1970s with the publication of an essay 
by investigative reporter Senda Kako. He was the first to introduce 
the term jugun-ianfu (comfort woman serving the army) in 1973. His 
book based on research in Korea after Japan and Korea re-
established diplomatic relations became a bestseller. It served as the 
basis for many works later published on the subject in Japanese and 
in English, and it was translated into Korean. But it wasn’t until the 
democratization movement of the 1980s got underway in South 
Korea that Korean historians took an interest. The women’s rights 
activist and historian Yun Jeong-ok played a pioneering role by 
publishing her own study in January 1990 in the independent Korean 
newspaper Hankyoreh, created in 1987 by opposition journalists 
repressed under the military dictatorship.10 
                                                     
9  An article published in the newspaper Asahi shinbun dated 13 October 2013, 
revealed that the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs had on 30 July 1993 sent a 
confidential directive to the Japanese embassies in Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Malaysia requesting that they not question local populations about the ianfu issue. 
10  Led by General Chun Doo-whan (b. 1931) following the dictatorship of 
President Park Chung-hee (1917-1979) from 1961 à 1979. 
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Out in the open: ten years of revelations, demands and controversies 
Although historians did not totally ignore the existence of the 
comfort women, it was only in the 1990s that their history began to 
occupy a specific place in Japanese political and ideological debates. 
 In May 1990, during the South Korean president’s official visit to 
Japan, Korean women’s organizations demanded reparations for the 
women drafted into the “women’s volunteer corps,” or teishintai, a 
euphemism used in both South and North Korea to refer to the 
ianfu.11 On 6 June 1990, in response to a question from Socialist 
senator Motooka Shoji, a member of the Japanese government 
provoked anger in South Korea and strong reactions in Japan by 
denying all direct responsibility by the army. Faced with Japan’s 
insistence that the women were recruited only by private 
businessmen, thirty-seven Korean feminist groups created the 
Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by 
Japan,12 and presented their seven demands in a letter addressed to 
the Japanese government.13 In 1991, Kim Hak-sun (1924-1997) was 
the first comfort woman to come all the way to Tokyo to testify, 
before a room packed with journalists. She brought a case against the 
Japanese state as part of a group legal action launched together with 
former forced laborers. 
                                                     
11  Letting them disappear within an umbrella term that could cover both women 
who had only worked in factories and those who had been drafted into sexual 
slavery. 
12  The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan. 
In Korean and Japanese only the euphemism teishintai appears in the name of the 
Council. 
13  These seven demands were:  
Acknowledgement that force was used to recruit the ianfu. 
An official, public apology from the Japanese state. 
Full disclosure of the barbarity of the acts committed against them. 
A monument erected in their memory and honor. 
Payment of legally recognized compensation to surviving victims or their families. 
Transmission of the facts about the ianfu to future generations through history 
education. 
Creation of an archive and a documentation center. 
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 The Japanese opposition mobilized to support them, demanding 
that a government commission be created to investigate. It was in this 
tense political climate that Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa 
arrived in South Korea on a state visit in 1992. The head of Japan’s 
government expressed regret and promised to create a commission to 
investigate. Its conclusions were summarized in the 1993 Kôno 
Declaration, named for then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kôno, a 
member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).14 This declaration, 
which acknowledged the direct or indirect involvement of the 
Imperial Japanese Army “in the establishment, management, and 
transport of the comfort women,” as well as the forced nature of 
their recruitment, was considered historic. In 1995, as part of a Peace, 
Friendship, and Exchange Initiative on the fiftieth anniversary of the 
war’s end, the creation of a semi-private compensation fund known 
as the Asian Women’s Fund15 was announced, amid tensions, at the 
initiative of Murayama Tomiichi, the Socialist Prime Minister of the 
coalition government during the first, brief change of government 
since 1948. The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Sexual 
Slavery by Japan criticized the semi-private character of the fund. Its 
appeals for donations from the public and reliance on volunteers 
made it seem to them like a charitable operation, rather than the 
official reparations they had demanded of the government. 
 Meanwhile, the right wing of the LDP was mobilizing actively 
against acknowledgement of the Japanese army’s involvement. 
Certain members of the Japanese government had already asserted in 
1994 that the ianfu voluntarily prostituted themselves: with the far 
right wing of the Liberal Democratic Party (LPD) back at the helm, 
the “Kôno Declaration” was criticized for having gone too far. The 
statements of the Minister of Justice, Nagano Shigeto,16 in 1994, 
reflected this retreat and signaled the start of a revisionist offensive 
that has continued to develop, intended to call into question the 
                                                     
14  The party in power since 1955. 
15  Josei no tameno ajia heiwa kokumin kikin in Japanese. 
16  A former army chief of staff, he was forced to resign 11 days after taking office 
for his revisionist statements about the Nanjing Massacre in the Japanese 
newspaper Mainichi Shimbun. 
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truthfulness of the women’s testimony. This has consisted, on the 
one hand, of a campaign of insults against former ianfu on the 
internet and in mangas, and on the other, of works by historians close 
to politicians on the right or extreme right such as historian Hata 
Ikuhiko,17 who contests, for example, the conclusions of Yoshimi 
Yoshiaki,18 a professor at Chuo University.19 For over two decades, 
the right and the extreme right have vied with each other to claim 
that no proof exists that any women were coerced. Prime Minister 
Abe, back in power since the December 2012 elections, regularly 
repeats the same message. Revisionist historians of the Fifteen-Year 
War (1931-1945) and the Asia-Pacific War (1937-1945) have 
challenged feminist histories by questioning the validity of the 
testimony of former ianfu, through a systematic campaign of slander 
against them. These battles over interpretations of history are closely 
linked to the antagonism between those working to transform Japan 
into a “normal” – that is, armed – country, no longer bound by 
Article 9 of the 1946 Constitution that proclaims Japan’s everlasting 
renunciation of war, and adherents to the tenets of postwar pacifism 
who want their point of view to prevail and not be marginalized. 
The convergence of national and international criticism 
International condemnation of violence against women is the product 
of the convergence of two movements, one pacifist and the other 
feminist. The most significant steps in winning support from the 
international community for this cause can be traced through 
successive reports produced by different UN commissions. The first 
of these was presented in 1993 by Theo Van Boven, Special 
Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities. There, for the first time, he used the 
expression “sexual slaves” concerning the system established by the 
Japanese Imperial Army (UN, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8). Also in 1993, 
the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna recognized that 
violations of the fundamental rights of women in situations of armed 
                                                     
17  Hata 1999. 
18  Yoshimi 1992. 
19  Nanta 2001. 
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conflict infringe the founding principles of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. In 1995, the Action Plan adopted during the 
Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing specified that acts of 
violence against women in armed conflicts constitute war crimes, and 
urged the countries in question to carry out thorough investigations, 
compensate the victims, make authentic apologies, and prosecute the 
criminals. In 1996, Radhika Coomaraswamy20, Special Rapporteur on 
Violence Against Women for the UN Commission on Human Rights 
(E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.1), included in her report recommendations 
addressed to the Japanese government about fulfilling the demands 
of the comfort women.21 In 1998, Gay J. McDougall,22 Special 
Rapporteur of a working group on systematic rape, sexual slavery, 
and slavery-like practices in armed conflict for the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the Protection of 
Minorities of the UN Commission on Human Rights,23 underlined 
the need to break the vicious circle created when sexual violence in 
wartime goes unpunished. These different reports brought 
international support for the mobilization Korean and Japanese 
feminists had initiated on behalf of Korean survivors. But in Japan, 
repeated attempts to seek justice met with failure, providing impetus 
for a new project: to hold an international people’s tribunal, modeled 
on the Russell Tribunal of the 1960s.24 
                                                     
20  She was named Under-Secretary-General, Special Representative for Children 
and Armed Conflict by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in April 2006. 
21  Many experts are critical of the content of this report, based on the book, filled 
with errors, by George Hicks (1995), and of the report’s inexact references 
(Onuma 2007: 149). 
22  http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/0/3d25270b5fa3ea998025665f0032f220 
23  This report was also criticized: in particular, the (inaccurate) reference to the 
declaration of a deputy, Arafune Seijuro (1907-1980), according to which only 
25% of the 200,000 comfort women had survived. Arafune (“Arahune” in the 
report) refers to the treaty which nowhere mentions the existence of the ianfu, 
but cites 1,030,684 Korean forced laborers or draftees, of whom 102, 603 had 
perished (http://www.awf.or.jp/1/facts-07.html, accessed 01/07/2013). 
24  This was a people’s tribunal founded in November 1966 by Bertrand Russell and 
Jean-Paul Sartre following the publication of Russell’s book War Crimes in 
Vietnam.  
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The Women’s International Tribunal and its objectives 
On 8 December 2000, 1,300 people attended the opening of the 
Tribunal in the main auditorium of Kudan Kaikan Hall in Tokyo, a 
grand Western-style building with a traditional East Asian roof 
designed by the architect Ryoichi Kawamoto in 1934. The Tribunal 
was not connected to the judicial system of any state or group of 
states, nor was it part of an international organization. Rather, this 
people’s tribunal was the product of its activist founders’25 will to 
bring the truth to light and to draw attention to the rules of 
international law that could apply to matters of public concern. The 
Tribunal’s role was to make the voices of former comfort women 
heard. Its short duration – keeping in mind that the Tokyo War 
Crimes Trials lasted 28 months – shows that it was mainly intended 
as a media event. 
The Charter, the prosecutors and the judges 
The Charter of the “Women’s International Tribunal” was drafted by 
the International Organizing Committee (see below) and approved by 
judges selected because of their reputations as leaders of the 
campaign to stop violence against women: Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, 
former President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia; Carmen Argibay, member of the Supreme Court 
of Argentina and President of the International Association of 
Women Judges; Christine Chinkin, Professor of International Law in 
London and participant in many UN Observer Missions; and Willy 
Mutunga,26 president of the Kenyan Bar Association and of the 
Kenya Human Rights Commission. 
 The Charter27 established the tribunal’s jurisdiction as covering 
crimes against humanity, including sexual crimes. It required that the 
                                                     
25  Those who initiated it included a representative of the Korean Council for the 
Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, Yun Chung Ok, Yayori 
Matsui, representative of VAWW-NET Japan, and Indai Sajor, representative of the 
Asian Centre for Women’s Human Rights (ASCENT). 
26  Currently the president of the Kenyan Supreme Court. 
27  « Annex 2 – Charter of The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal On 
Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery », Droit et cultures, 58 
[http://droitcultures.revues.org/2189] (accessed 28 June 2013). 
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court determine the guilt or innocence of the defendants based on 
the evidence presented, but Article 14 specified that because of the 
massive destruction of documents at the time of Japan’s defeat it 
would also be possible to register an indeterminate verdict in some 
cases. In practice, the central focus of the trial would be the question 
of the Emperor’s responsibility. The Emperor was accused of letting 
the system of sexual slavery continue by maintaining his silence. 
 The groups of prosecutors from different Asian countries28 
included specialists on violence against women and representatives 
involved in the defense of comfort women. Chief Prosecutors 
Patricia Viseur Sellers29 and Usitinia Dolgopol represented them. In 
their submissions to the Tribunal, they asked that the verdict be 
determined in application of the laws in force at the time. They 
enumerated the international laws of the period that the Japanese 
government and army had violated. They emphasized that the denials 
and silence of the Japanese government had perpetuated this 
violation of international law. Patricia Viseur Sellers in her closing 
statement stressed that the Asian Women’s Fund did not constitute 
an appropriate response by the Japanese government, and that she 
expected the Court to recommend just and satisfactory reparations 
for the victims. 
 The Organizing Committee had made an effort to bring together 
experts from five continents through this trial. By obtaining support 
from high-ranking women professionals in international law, the 
committee showed that the trial was intended not only as a tribunal 
for denouncing sexual crimes, but also as a step toward adoption of 
international laws prohibiting violence against women in wartime. 
And indeed, the first judgment to qualify rape as a crime against 
                                                     
28  Ten countries were represented: Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Philippines, 
Indonesia, East Timor, Malaysia, Taiwan, China, and Holland. 
29  She was a Legal Advisor for Gender Related Crimes and Senior Acting Trial 
Attorney in the Office of the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
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humanity would be pronounced by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at the Foca trial in 2001.30 
 In the absence of any representative of the Japanese government, 
which had ignored the invitation of the Tribunal, three lawyers acting 
in the capacity of amicus curiae31 came to present the arguments for the 
defense. 
The witnesses 
The Tribunal’s aim was to focus on the victims, in response to 
revisionists who had rehabilitated various arguments put forward by 
the defense during the Tokyo War Crimes Trials of 1946-1948,32 and to 
the separate judgment pronounced by the Indian judge Radhabinod 
Pal, for whom the real wrong committed by Japan was not its war 
crimes but rather its attack on the Western powers’ colonies.33 While 
referring to new paradigms of postcolonial historiography, the Tribunal 
reaffirmed the principles of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, 
rejecting any potential amalgam between its own anti-colonial critiques 
and those of the revisionists who maintained that Japan had simply 
wanted to liberate the colonies of the Asian continent from the yoke of 
Western imperialism. Committed activists and lawyers working for the 
cause also saw this as an opportunity to point out that even 
international law had in practice reproduced political values reflecting 
Eurocentrism and masculine domination, by totally ignoring the plight 
of these Asian women reduced to slavery. To make public the facts in 
                                                     
30  The ICTY condemned three Serb military leaders for using rape as a weapon of 
terror and tool of ethnic cleansing [http://www.viol-tactique-de-guerre.org/le-
tribunal-penal-international,522.html] (accessed 20 June 2013). 
31  An Anglo-American legal term designating an individual or entity who is not a 
party to judicial proceedings but is allowed to provide information to the court 
that might shed light on issues of law or fact.  
32  It should be noted that much false testimony was given, without sanction 
(Akazawa 1989: 45-46). 
33  Five judges (from India, France, Holland, Australia and the Philippines) disagreed 
on the final verdict, but from opposing viewpoints. The Philippine representative 
considered the sentences too light and strongly criticized the Indian judge’s 
opinion. The French judge thought it illogical to exempt the Emperor. 
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this international forum was to offer the victims an opportunity for 
true catharsis. 
 And indeed the testimony of the women constituted the high 
point of the Tribunal.34 Thirty-five of the sixty-four plaintiffs, 
representing eight countries, were able to take part in the trial and 
testify. Video conferencing enabled those who could not be present 
to participate. All testified on their own behalf. A Chinese woman, 
Wan Ai-Hua, who was 14 years old at the time of the events and had 
suffered particularly serious physical consequences, was literally 
overwhelmed by her memories and had to be hospitalized (testimony 
related in § 168-169). One after another, these accounts told of 
suffering lasting months and months – even years and years – 
following rapes committed before some of them had even reached 
puberty, under threat of violence, in front of their families, or after 
the murder of other family members. Marta Abu Bere of Timor, a 
young girl taken away along with another friend her age, told of 
facing repeated rapes at night after serving soldiers all day. Women 
who tried to resist were severely repressed. Song Shin-do (b. 1922) 
had a Japanese name (Kaneko) tattooed on her left arm and suffered 
numerous other after-effects including hearing loss in her left ear and 
scars from a sword on her thigh and lower abdomen; following an 
ordeal of more than seven years, shuttled from one “comfort station” 
to another, she had lost all faith in humankind. Initiating legal 
proceedings, making her voice heard, and sharing her suffering with 
other people she felt that she had recovered a little of her human 
dignity. Maria Rosa Luna Henson (b. 1927) was imprisoned for nine 
months in a storeroom at a slaughterhouse where from two in the 
afternoon to ten at night she had to receive an uninterrupted line of 
soldiers. Accused of alerting villagers of an offensive by the Japanese 
army, she was tortured and finally saved in extremis by members of a 
Philippine guerilla group. 
 In addition to these poignant and moving testimonies, the Court 
heard from historians, psychologists and lawyers who had defended 
the victims at trials held during the 1990s. Statements were also taken 
from two former soldiers, Kaneko Yasuji (b. 1920) and Suzuki 
                                                     
34  See Ajia 1997. 
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Yoshio (b. 1920), prisoners of war who had returned to Japan in 1956 
and joined the Association of Returnees from China (Chukiren),35 
created in 1957. Published by this association in 1957,36 the first 
collection of eyewitness accounts of the war crimes committed in 
China had been forcefully attacked by veterans’ associations. Nor did 
the collection receive any better reception from the public, which saw 
the book as an instrument of communist propaganda. But 
investigations conducted in the province of Shanxi during the 1990s 
and 2000s revealed how widespread mass rape had been in China,37 
corroborating their testimony. The men’s depositions at the trial 
refuted arguments which had aimed to legitimize the requisition of 
women as a means of preventing rape. They insisted that this policy 
did not eliminate mass rape. They explained that although the official 
regulations prohibited it, rape was tolerated and even encouraged as a 
means of demoralizing and humiliating the enemy.38  
The prosecution, the defendants, and the verdict: the question of the Emperor 
Although the explicit purpose of the Tribunal was to break the 
silence and denounce the “culture of impunity” (§ 9), it was also a 
response to the revisionist offensive described above. This second 
aim explains the Women’s International Tribunal’s constant 
references to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(explicit in § 81-83), despite its criticism that the latter did not 
condemn sexual crimes against women. The Tokyo trial of 1946-1948 
was still regarded as the founding act of a new democratic regime, like 
the new democratic and pacifist Constitution of 1946. As the 
Nuremburg and Tokyo trials had done, the Tribunal aspired to 
demonstrate the responsibility of the army and the Japanese state, not 
by trying individuals for crimes committed in the exceptional 
                                                     
35  This association has to date published over 116 collections or books of 
eyewitness accounts. 
36  Collective 1957. 
37  Kasahara 1997: 6. See the list: http://www.ne.jp/asahi/tyuukiren/web-
site/backnumber/06/kasahara_seihanzai.htm (accessed 26 June 2013). 
38  Paragraph § 559 of the judgment of 2001 also refers to statements made during 
the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, according to which soldiers were advised to kill 
women after raping them “to avoid trouble”. 
 The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal, Tokyo 2000      137 
 
 
circumstances created by war, but by sanctioning the existence of a 
crime which had been organized and systematized. 
Who was on trial? 
The accused included Emperor Hirohito (1901-1989), General Andô 
Rikichi (1884-1946),39 Hata Shunroku (1879-1962),40 Itagaki Seishirô 
(1885-1948),41 Kobayashi Seizô(1877-1962),42 Matsui Iwane (1878-
1948),43 Terauchi Hisauchi (1879-1946),44 Tôjô Hideki (1884-1948),45 
and Umezu Yoshijirô (1882-1949).46 Yamashita Tomoyuki, known as 
the “Malaysian Tiger” and executed in 1946 in the Philippines, was 
accused because of his responsibility in the mass rapes committed in 
Mapanique, Philippines. With the exception of the Emperor, who 
had been exonerated during the trial at the end of the war, all of the 
defendants were men who had been condemned in 1948 and had 
either died or been executed since. The Emperor had of course been 
spared for political reasons, after intervention by General MacArthur. 
In exchange, the Emperor had agreed to give up his divine status in a 
declaration broadcast on Japanese radio on 1 January 1946. To justify 
the Emperor’s exemption from indictment, he had been presented as 
a mere symbolic authority who did not intervene in worldly affairs 
and held no decision-making power. This had required some 
cooperation from the defendants themselves, and also that certain 
compromised members of the Imperial family should not appear 
before the court.47 In postwar Japan, the issue of the Emperor’s guilt 
                                                     
39  Former governor of Taiwan, arrested in Shanghai at Japan’s defeat, he 
committed suicide in 1946. 
40  Sentenced to life in prison, he was freed in 1955 by the Hatoyama government.  
41  Sentenced to death and executed in 1948. 
42  Governor-General of Taiwan in 1937, arrested as a war criminal, he was released 
before the trial.   
43  Sentenced to death and executed in 1948, he was held responsible for the Nankin 
massacre. 
44  Commander of the Japanese army in North China, he died in prison in Malaysia.  
45  A general and politician, he was Prime Minister from 1941-1944. Sentenced and 
executed in December 1948.  
46  A general, he died serving a life sentence in prison.  
47  Bix 2000; Dower 1999. 
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had become a strict taboo, enforced through systematic intimidation 
by extreme-right-wing activists.48 Quite paradoxically, the end of the 
Cold War did not pave the way for consensus on the question of 
Japan’s responsibility for the war. Alongside certain signs of 
appeasement, a new, very popular brand of revisionism emerged, 
represented by figures like manga author Kobayashi Yoshinori,49 that 
called into question the Tokyo War Crimes Trials in the same terms 
as before. The purpose of the Women’s International Tribunal was 
both to reaffirm the political responsibility of the defendants of 1948 
and to invoke again the primary responsibility of the Emperor, but 
this time for crimes connected with the institutionalization of sexual 
slavery and rape. 
 Prosecutors from different countries had drafted the list of 
defendants. Thus, although Okamura Yasuji50 remains conspicuously 
absent from the list of principal defendants, despite the fact that the 
archives show him to be the instigator of the system of comfort 
stations,51 his name does figure on a separate list of defendants drafted 
by the Chinese and Korean prosecutors; and he is also cited in the 
historical description of the installation of the comfort stations (§ 142-
200). It is amply clear that this Women’s International Tribunal of 
Tokyo aimed to pick up where the IMTFE had left off, and also to 
build on the criticism emitted by the left and the extreme left regarding 
the Emperor’s exemption from responsibility. Both the indictment and 
the verdict that was handed down amply illustrate this.52 
                                                     
48  For example in 1990, Hitoshi Motoshima, the mayor of Nagasaki, was attacked 
by an extreme right group for his statements about Emperor Hirohito’s 
responsibility. 
49  Thomann 2007; Nanta 2001. 
50  He escaped arrest in Japan thanks to General He Yingqin, Minister of War of 
Chiang Kai-shek’s government, who decided to try him in China to spare him 
appearing before the IMTFE. Found not guilty, he took charge of repatriating 
one million Japanese soldiers and one million Japanese civilians living in China. 
51  Inaba 1970. 
52   http://www.iccwomen.org/wigjdraft1/Archives/oldWCGJ/tokyo/judgmentannounce.htm 




On the fourth day, the tribunal delivered the verdict. It was published 
in a final text on 4 December 2001 in The Hague. Emperor Hirohito 
was found guilty of criminal negligence according to § 2 of Article 3 
of the Charter of the Tribunal. General Matsui was acknowledged to 
be guilty of participating in the system of sexual slavery, in 
accordance with § 1 of the same Article 3. The announcement of 
their guilt brought intense joy and displays of great satisfaction on the 
part of the victims and everyone present. 
 To be recognized by an international community brought the 
victims both catharsis and a feeling that they were supported morally, 
encouraging them to pursue their action. The Tribunal was not of 
course empowered to enforce the judgment it had handed down, but 
it brought international legitimacy to the demands of these former 
comfort women. It must be noted that because of the systematic 
destruction of documents by the Japanese army as defeat approached, 
the Tribunal chose not to pronounce on the guilt of the remaining 
defendants, drawing here on the precedent set by the Tokyo War 
Crimes Tribunal which did not rule on the cases of two defendants 
(note 9, p. 7 of the report).53 The Japanese government’s impunity in 
the case of the comfort women was attributed to the Tokyo War 
Crimes Tribunal which, although aware of the facts, had showed 
serious discrimination in its rulings (§ 4). Nonetheless, the principal 
defendant remained the Japanese state, which had done nothing for 
over half a century and then remained unresponsive to the demands 
made since the 1990s. 
Toward new feminist perspectives? 
The most original aspect of the Women’s International Tribunal, 
extending the work of the movement to support the comfort women 
that began in the 1990s, remains the central role it reserved for 
eyewitness testimony. Such accounts, particularly because they 
describe events dating back more than fifty years, must of course be 
used with caution. Pressure on the witnesses from the public and 
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activist organizations also intensified as the movement developed.54 
But the fact that the words of former comfort women were 
considered, while not to be overemphasized, also suggests that the 
rise of women’s history spurred an epistemological break in this area. 
Since the 1970s, the methodological encounter between women’s 
history and oral history (leading to testimony being collected directly 
from women), still in its infancy at the time, had led feminists to 
discover the existence of former comfort women, notably in 
Okinawa. In 1977, lawyer Omori Noriko55 began by interviewing a 
former Chinese ianfu, Pae Pong gi, on the island of Okinawa where 
traces of 134 “comfort stations” have been identified to date, 
according to the Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace 
(WAM).56 She then led a team of lawyers in the legal proceedings 
initiated by Chinese women from the province of Shanxi, making 
over 20 trips there during the 1990s and 2000s to conduct research 
on sexual slavery.  
 Along with the Nanjing Massacre and – particularly during 
Koizumi-led governments – Japanese prime ministers’ controversial 
courtesy visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors the souls of 
those who have died in the service of the Emperor since the Meiji 
Restoration57 (including war criminals executed in 1948 and 
transferred there unofficially by those in charge of the shrine)58 the 
fate of the “comfort women” has been one of the thorniest issues in 
Japan’s recent diplomatic relations, particularly with South Korea and 
China. Today, along with the disputed border islands of 
Senkaku/Diaoyu and Takeshima/Dokdo (the Liancourt Rocks), the 
                                                     
54  Soh 2008: 79-106. 
55  Omori & Kawada 2010. 
56  http://www.wam-peace.org/index.php/ianfu-mondai/qa 
57  The Yasukuni Shrine was initially built in 1869 to honor soldiers who had died 
fighting for the Emperor during the civil wars. More than two million of a total 
of nearly two-and-a-half million soldiers died during the Asia-Pacific war, making 
the shrine a symbol of that conflict. 
58  It was only on April 19, 1979 that the transfer of the souls of 14 Class A war 
criminals, including Hideki Tōjō, came to light. This secret transfer shocked the 
public at the time. In the Yasukuni Shrine’s brochure, these individuals are 
presented as “martyrs of the Showa era” (1926-1989). 
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question of the comfort women remains a source of Japan’s 
deteriorating relations with both countries. Within Japan, together with 
the army’s responsibility for mass suicides in Okinawa and the Nanjing 
massacre, the question of the ianfu has also provoked ongoing debates 
over the content of school textbooks. The most violent reactions in 
this respect have come from conservatives allied with negationists in 
Japan, resulting in the creation of the Japanese Society for History 
Textbook Reform in 1997.59 The Women’s International Tribunal was 
a response to these denials, attracting international support for the 
memory work being undertaken by militant pacifists concerned to 
defend both the victims and human rights. 
 In addition to providing catharsis for the victims, the tribunal also 
made the public aware of the problem of violence against women in 
general. It drew attention to new paradigms of women’s history as 
well as to analyses of historical issues such as the connections 
between prostitution and patriarchal society. The virulent reactions to 
the Tribunal showed that the women subjected to such humiliation 
continue to face both contempt and prejudices, reflecting the 
persistence of misogyny in today’s societies.60 During the first decade 
of the twenty-first century, an antifeminist offensive was founded 
precisely on efforts to discount the former comfort women. But why 
would the movement to support them raise so much suspicion in a 
Japanese public that in principle has fewer prejudices about Korea 
and Koreans than the previous generation had, as demonstrated by 
the successful reception in Japan of the World Cup hosted by South 
Korea in 2002, and of the Korean TV series Winter Sonata (Gyeoul 
yeonga) broadcast in Japan in 2003-2004? 
 In 1998, Ueno Chizuko published a book61 announcing 
feminism’s radical and historic break with nationalism. Fifteen years 
later, Japanese feminist associations are more determined than ever to 
continue seeking solidarity with the women of other Asian countries. 
Breaking with nationalisms of all kinds offers both a starting point 
and the perspective required to supersede the antagonisms of the past 
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but also of the present. Although the Tribunal definitely condemned 
nationalism in Japan, it had more difficulty moving beyond that of 
other nations, in particular South and North Korea. 
 What is preventing real solidarity and satisfactory resolution of the 
problem of the comfort women? The Tribunal’s verdict emphasized 
the insufficiency of the Kono Declarations and of the official 
apologies subsequently offered by the Prime Minister (§ 977 and 
§ 978). The word “owabi” was seen as ambiguous compared with the 
expression shazai, which better conveys a sense of guilt (§ 985 to 
§ 988). However, the criticisms of the Asian Women’s Fund were in 
some ways biased.62 For example, the final verdict published in The 
Hague in 2001 mentioned nowhere that just over a half of the former 
ianfu accepted compensation and the letter of apology from then-
Prime Minister Hashimoto (1937-2006) of Japan. The Asian 
Women’s Fund was of course not well regarded in Korea, but the 
results of its work varied from one country to another. In Holland, 
the 79 women who came forward all accepted compensation from 
the fund, and many responded to the Prime Minister’s letter of 
apology with letters of thanks and recognition. In the Philippines 
also, many women accepted the compensation and the letter. In total, 
364 women received payments, with the majority from the 
Philippines (about 450 women came forward in 2000 during the 
information campaign) and the Netherlands (79). In South Korea, 
only seven out of 231 accepted, and only one in Taiwan, who was not 
officially counted.63 In South Korea, a national campaign raised 
awareness and funds to support the former ianfu financially. The 
Korean government under President Kim Dae-jung gave them 
financial aid on the condition that they not have accepted any money 
from the Asian Women’s Fund. Eleven women who had received 
compensation from the Fund were thus denied additional aid, and 
were then violently stigmatized as “traitors” to the national cause.64 
 Although the Japanese state can be criticized for not taking steps 
to resolve the issue of the statute of limitations – is there a statute of 
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63  Ônuma 2007: 75. 
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limitations on crimes against humanity? – did the Fund and its 
initiators not seek to make up for this in an unfavorable context? Did 
they set out to support the deplorable attitude of the Japanese state, 
or try to advance the cause of the victims? The Fund’s impact 
remains to be assessed. The few generally positive lines about it in the 
ruling are not convincing. Finally, while the Tribunal continually 
reiterated the need for material reparations based on legal 
recognition, it brought no progress on that front, its judgments 
remaining only wishful thinking, since they were based on an 
initiative without sufficient support from local forces to have any 
influence on the balance of political and diplomatic power relations. 
 The movement to rehabilitate the former comfort women is far 
from having exhausted or resolved the political and social issues it 
raises. A project of critical reflection in various directions is under 
way, with some approaches moving to deepen the feminist 
perspective65 while others see questions of gender and post-
colonialism as inseparable.66 These debates enrich a movement whose 
aim was to reestablish historical truth, restore the dignity of the 
victims, and bring them justice. The essential role of this Tribunal 
was to participate in the fight to stop violence against women in 
wartime. The founding of the Women’s Active Museum on War and 
Peace in 2005 is its most substantial achievement. Yet although the 
Women’s International Tribunal created a framework for bringing the 
issue of gender into the memory of war, it did not bring an end to the 
memory wars in the region. Both the political and the diplomatic 
conflicts at the time of writing, in 2013, make this clear. 
 
Translated by Anne EPSTEIN 
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